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Abstract  
This project was developed within the internship at Millennium bcp Private Banking. 
The present study intends to improve the actual selection process used by Millennium 
Bcp’s Wealth Management Unit when choosing a new mutual fund to be included in the 
clients’ portfolios. Most of existing studies provide compelling arguments to support 
their theories, finding some important and useful factors that should be taken into 
account when identifying the best mutual funds. To achieve the goal, it was analyzed the 
selection process of the Wealth Management Unit in order to find out where it could be 
improved. Secondly, analyzing many literature, we selected one particular factor that 
not only has been recently capturing much attention within the mutual fund industry but 
also it is not taken into account by Millennium bcp’s Wealth Management Unit. The 
chosen factor was the Active Share proposed firstly by Cremers and Petajisto (2009). 
Finally, following Petajisto (2013) with a sample of 205 US and 270 Eurozone mutual 
funds from January 2000 to December 2014, Active Share’s predictive power was 
tested. We did not find statistically significant results to conclude it must be considered 
in an equity fund selection process as a tool to predict future outperformance. 
 
Key-words: mutual fund, selection process, outperformance, millennium bcp’s wealth 
management unit 
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Resumo  
Este projeto foi desenvolvido durante o estágio realizado no Millennium bcp Private 
Banking. O presente estudo visa melhorar o atual processo de seleção de fundos de 
investimento usado pela Wealth Management Unit – Equipa de seleção de fundos do 
Millennium bcp. Muitos dos estudos existentes nesta matéria fornecem argumentos 
convincentes que suportam as suas teorias, salientando alguns fatores que devem ser 
tomados em conta quando se quer identificar os melhores fundos dentro de uma 
específica classe de ativos. Para atingir o objetivo, foi analisado o processo de seleção 
de fundos da Wealth Management Unit do Millennium bcp, a fim de perceber onde 
podia ser melhorado. Analisando a literatura acerca do tópico, selecionámos um fator 
em particular que não só tem capturado muita atenção na indústria dos fundos de 
investimento, como também não é utilizado pela equipa do Millennium bcp aquando de 
uma nova seleção. O indicador escolhido foi o Active Share proposto por Cremers and 
Petajisto (2009). Seguindo a metodologia aplicada em Petajisto (2013) e com uma 
amostra de 205 e 270 fundos do mercado dos Estados Unidos da América e da Zona 
Euro, respetivamente, desde Janeiro de 2000 até Dezembro de 2014, foi testado o poder 
preditivo do Active Share. Não encontrámos evidência estatística que nos permitisse 
concluir que o Active Share deve ser considerado no processo de seleção de fundos de 
investimento. 
 
Palavras-chave: fundos de investimento, processo de seleção, outperformance, 
millennium bcp’s wealth management unit 
  
JEL - códigos: G11, G11, G17   
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1. Introduction  
This report was developed at Millennium bcp Private Banking where the internship took 
place for six months. The internship took place at the Wealth Management Unit 
(hereinafter WMU) – Fund Selection Team (hereinafter Team) of Millennium bcp’s 
Private Banking and it was performed in full time working hours, five days a week 
during the six months.  
Are there mutual funds which consistently outperform a given benchmark? If yes, how 
can the Team identify those funds? Is it possible to identify skilled active managers ex-
ante? Actually, these questions often bear in the mind of the members of the Team and 
the mutual fund investors worldwide. Indeed, one of the main concerns of the Team is 
to select the best mutual funds within the various asset classes in order to include them 
in the list of recommended funds. So it is crucial to have an efficient and sophisticated 
selection process to ensure that it is being chosen the best mutual fund among a specific 
asset class.  
According to Barras et al. (2010), some managers have skills that allow them to 
outperform the market, net of fees, but that distinguishing these skilled managers from 
those whose good performance is simply due to luck is very difficult to do. Indeed, 
whenever an investor starts a selection of a mutual fund, he faces this problem. 
Actually, this is the role played by the WMU Team. With its specialized skills in 
analyzing and screening mutual funds, the Team adds value to Millennium bcp by 
trying to select the best managers across all asset classes. 
Over the internship’s period we carried out a relevant study for the department which 
aimed to improve a core task of the Team – the selection process of mutual funds. The 
main responsibility of the Team is to screen, select, recommend and monitor the most 
consistent long term performing funds within a diversified range of the global asset 
classes, namely equity, fixed income and alternative funds. The selected and 
recommended funds are then delivered to the Millennium bcp’s clients. All funds 
selected by the Team are actively-managed funds, so they have a portfolio manager 
managing the fund on a daily basis. The Team thinks that having a specialist managing 
and monitoring daily the portfolio of the fund is the best way to reach better and 
sustained long term performance. Typically, to understand if a portfolio manager (or a 
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mutual fund) is delivering good performance, the Team compares it with a particular 
benchmark. However, it is difficult to understand ex-ante which mutual fund, within a 
given universe, will perform better in the future.  
However, is the current WMU’s selection process missing some key points, indicators 
or questions? Can it be improved? The study we will develop consists in improving the 
equity fund selection process of WMU. We will test a specific factor, selected after 
analyzing the WMU’s selection process as well as many literature in the topic, in order 
to conclude whether it must be considered in a mutual fund selection process or not. By 
developing this study we will try to improve the accuracy and efficiency of the WMU’s 
equity fund selection process. If we could find compelling results, the Team will get a 
better selection process which will allow them to identify the potential best performer 
equity funds in the future more easily.  
The methodology of the study we will develop involves a set of steps that we will 
briefly describe. Firstly, we will analyze many literature about mutual funds, 
particularly about some factors we should look when we want to select the best mutual 
funds within a specific asset class. Secondly, we will analyze and describe the WMU’s 
equity fund selection process in an attempt to find out where it can be improved. In the 
third stage of the study, we will choose one particular factor, among the ones described 
within the literature review, that WMU does not consider to be important when 
comparing funds, but which is relevant in the light of the literature presented. The 
indicator will be the Active Share. After that, we will test it, following the methodology 
of the study already done, namely Petajisto (2013), with a sample of 205 US and 270 
Eurozone mutual funds. Lastly, we will analyze the results and discuss whether Active 
Share should be considered in an equity fund selection process or not. 
The main goal of the study is to improve the actual selection process used by 
Millennium Bcp’s WMU when choosing a new mutual fund to be included in the 
clients’ portfolios. To achieve the goal, we will not only look to the current selection 
process of the WMU, but also test if Active Share plays a key role in identifying future 
outperformer funds.  
The remaining report is structured as follows: Section 2 briefly presents Millennium 
bcp, the WMU Fund Selection Team and a description of the internship; Section 3 
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reviews de literature with respect to fund selection criteria including the relation 
between funds’ past performance with their future performance, the relation between 
the macroeconomic environment and the outperformance, the relation between 
outperformance and specific characteristics of the fund, fund managers and fund 
management companies as well as the relation between the fund’s holdings and 
outperformance; Section 4 describes the WMU equity fund selection process and some 
proposed improvements; Section 5 goes through the entire process regarding the study 
of the indicator Active Share such as the relevance of testing it, the objectives of the 
study, the data and selected sample and lastly the methodology carried out; Section 6 
presents the results obtained from the study and lastly, section 7 presents our main 
conclusions.  
  
 4 
 
2. Millennium bcp Private Banking: The internship 
In this chapter it is addressed a reflective analysis of the internship at Millennium bcp 
Private Banking, more precisely at the Wealth Management Unit, Fund Selection Team.  
Millennium bcp is the Portugal's biggest private-owned bank, with a prominent position 
in the financial market in Portugal. Millennium bcp is the biggest private banking 
institution in terms of market share - both in loans to customers and in total customer 
funds - with an expressive distribution network, with a total of 695 branches by the end 
of 2014. Particularly, Millennium bcp Private banking has 9 branches within Portugal, 
spread across Lisbon (5), Porto (3) and Braga (1). Furthermore, Millennium bcp Private 
Banking has also an operation at Poland, at Switzerland, through Millennium Banque 
Privée, as well as an offshore operation at Cayman Islands. 
Within its aggregate offer, Millennium bcp Private Banking offers two main 
distinguishing services: advisory and discretionary management. 
The objective of the Advisory service is to help the clients on the allocation of their 
financial wealth in accordance with their investment’s profile, obtained by a 
questionnaire they must answer prior to invest in order to assess their appetite for risk, 
their investment horizon and their knowledge about financial markets. In this service, 
all the client’s investments are regularly monitored. Whenever occur a specific change 
in market conditions, it is consequently suggested a tactical changes on the client’s 
portfolio, always taking into account his risk profile. All this service is provided by 
Investment Specialists, qualified and registered at Comissão de Mercados e Valores 
Mobiliários, within the WMU, as will be described later. 
On the other hand, Discretionary Management service consists in managing clients’ 
financial assets in accordance with a mandate given by the client. In this service, 
Millennium bcp structures a well-diversified portfolio (with equity, bond and alternative 
funds) suitable to the client’s risk profile. All these portfolios are composed by 
international mutual funds, managed by asset management companies worldwide, 
selected independently by WMU Fund Selection Team. It is important to highlight that 
all mutual funds selected by WMU are actively-managed mutual funds. Actively-
managed mutual funds are funds, as the name implies, which are managed by a skilled 
professional specialist. WMU Fund Selection Team selects actively-managed funds 
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since they believe there are fund managers that, throughout a market cycle, outperform 
their benchmarks in a consistent way.  
 
2.1. Mission and values 
According to Millennium bcp (2015), Private Banking’s mission is to provide 
investment solutions that fit their costumer’s specific needs, built on a customized 
global and independent financial and asset planning advisory service. Millennium bcp 
(2015) also states that what makes it different is its strength of maintaining solid 
prudence standards in the management of the assets entrusted to the bank, the trust each 
private banker is committed to listen, understand and provide support in the decision-
making process, personalized relation to the client, independence by ensuring total 
exemption in its advice and management of client’s assets, competence based on the 
expertise and skills of the teams and excellence by trying to exceed the expectations of 
the clients who entrust the bank with their assets. 
 
2.2. Wealth Management Team – Fund Selection Team 
In this sub section I will describe the department where the internship took place. As 
already mentioned, the internship took place at the Wealth Management Unit of 
Millennium bcp Private Banking. WMU comprises three different main areas, all with 
different responsibilities and roles.  
Figure 1 shows the organizational structure of the WMU. As it can be seen, WMU is 
initially divided into three different departments: strategy & products, advisory unit and 
wealth management department. Strategy & products’ section comprises the teams 
responsible for the fund selection, strategy and other products as well as the team which 
controls all the investments within the Private Banking. Advisory Unit covers all the 
functions regarding the advisory service as previously explained while the wealth 
management department includes all steps, especially the operational ones, regarding 
the discretionary management, also already explained before.  
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Figure 1. WMU's Organizational Structure 
 
Source: Millennium bcp Private Banking 
 
The internship was entirely done at Fund Selection department. Looking at Figure 1, it 
is visible that Fund Selection Team can be divided into Equity Funds, Fixed Income 
Funds, Alternative Funds and Technical support. It is important to highlight that these 
different areas do not mean different teams. This distinction is only presented to 
distinguish the three different types of funds the Team selects as well as to focus that 
each type of fund is monitored by a particular member of the Team. So Fund Selection 
Team comprises one person who is in charge for Equity Funds, another who is in charge 
for Fixed Income Funds and another in charge for the Alternative ones. All the Team is 
backed up by a member who gives a transversal technical support.  
In the internship, I supported all the Team. I was not allocated to a specific type of 
funds, being always available to support whatever member of the team whenever 
necessary. Therefore, during the internship, I reported directly to the head of the Fund 
Selection Team. 
The Fund Selection Team usually illustrates a parallelism to describe themselves. I will 
start by presenting that parallelism to explain the role played by them. Broadly 
speaking, when people looks to a world record holder in decathlon, they can consider 
him as the most complete athlete in the world since he is the world record holder in a 
sport which comprises ten different events. However, he is not the world best athlete 
within each event separately. Actually, the fact that he must train ten different sports 
takes away his capacity to compete on equal terms with the specialists of each genre. 
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Therefore, the goal of being the most complete athlete sacrifices the specialization 
which would be necessary to be the best one in each discipline. It is exactly this which 
characterizes the Fund Selection Team.  
Within the mutual fund industry, the Team seeks to select, in an independent way, the 
best specialists in order to maximize the final outcome. In fact, this is the great 
advantage of having a Team completely focused in selecting funds. Therefore, the Team 
aims to choose the best specialists in each asset class – its main goal. Globally, the 
Team is responsible for selecting and monitoring mutual funds which will be 
recommended and included in the clients’ portfolios, both discretionary and advisory 
portfolios. Discretionary and advisory portfolios are the ones which derive from the 
discretionary and advisory services, respectively, as it was previously described. 
To understand the role played by the Fund Selection Team at Millennium bcp Private 
Banking, it is presented here one fact that clearly shows its skills. Figure 2 shows the 
evolution of assets under management Millennium bcp holds in international mutual 
funds. 
Figure 2. Evolution of AuMs invested in international mutual funds 
 
Notes: this figure comprises the sum of the Millennium bcp’s assets under management invested in international funds through 
discretionary management portfolios and advisory portfolios, both  in Portugal and Switzerland, internet and retail branches, Poland 
and Intermoney Millennium Gestão de Ativos (as custodian bank). Source: Millennium bcp Private Banking 
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As it can be seen on Figure 2, the total assets under management at Millennium bcp 
have been exponentially increasing. Looking to this figure it can be concluded the Team 
has been adding a lot of value to the bank with its skills as fund selectors. In the 20-
month period from January 2014 to August 2015 the value of assets under management 
grew 84.5%. 
Figure 2 thus shows the job is being well done, although the value of AuMs has 
stabilized somewhat recently. Therefore, it seems to be not needed improving anything. 
Nevertheless, anything is perfect and everything has always space to improve. That is 
what this study intends to do.    
2.3. The internship 
The present project was developed at WMU Fund Selection Team where the internship 
took place. The internship was for six months in full time. The main objective of the 
internship was to support the Team in its daily functions and responsibilities, being one 
more helping to achieve WMU’s goals. In Millennium bcp I had the opportunity to 
work in a department of mutual funds, where the connection to the financial markets is 
central. I could deepen my background in finance, by working with a very skilled Team. 
I supported the Team in many tasks of its daily routine. As it was said, I was not 
allocated to any specific asset class, so my expertise has increased in all type of funds 
the Team covers.  
During the internship, I have participated in several meetings with asset management 
companies whenever they came to present new funds or to review the funds within the 
WMU’s recommended list. All funds within that list are monitored on a regular basis 
and so it is necessary to discuss the performance of the fund during a given period 
(normally 1 year), changes in the management team, performance attribution, 
comparison with its peer group and benchmark, manager’s outlook and so on with the 
asset management company, specifically with the management team who manages it. 
As of August 2015, the recommended list comprised 71 mutual funds spread across the 
three asset classes (29 equity funds, 20 fixed income funds and 22 alternative funds) and 
the funds’ review is done at least once per year. During the internship I have not only 
participated in the meetings, both face meetings and conference calls, but also supported 
the Team in producing the file notes which summarized the review. After that, all file 
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notes are presented to the WMU’s investment specialists (in Lisbon, Porto, Braga, 
Poland and Switzerland) of the advisory unit. In the internship I was also called to do 
these presentations.  
I also supported the team on producing the monthly reports of the recommended 
funds. These internal reports contain a single page’s analysis of each recommend fund 
as well as a summary of the main market events in the month. I was also in charge for 
producing a monthly presentation about the funds’ performance which was delivered to 
the private bankers, aiming to be a support whenever they have a meeting with clients.  
Another important part of the WMU’s activity is the asset allocation meetings which 
are conducted once per month. The Strategy & Other products’ department presents the 
outlook of the markets as well as an exhaustive market review of the month. This team 
has also a highly important role within the Private Banking, since they are in charge of 
defining the asset allocation of the discretionary portfolios. According to their outlook, 
they decide in which asset classes and sub asset classes the portfolios should be 
overweight, underweight or neutral. I have also participated in every asset allocation 
meeting during the six months. 
Whenever a fund does not meet what was expected in terms of performance, face a 
change in management team or a change in its investment philosophy or universe, it 
goes automatically to an “on watch” list. This list is carefully monitored and if the 
different/bad behaviour stays for too long, a new mutual fund selection is considered.  
During the internship, the Team conducted two fund selections, namely an Asia Pacific 
ex Japan equity fund and an Asian bond fund. In both selections I had the opportunity to 
help the team at many stages of the process: screening the universe of available funds, 
comparing the potential funds to be selected and analyzing each of them in order to 
identify the best one (in accordance with their pre-defined requisites that will be further 
presented later). Actually, it was during these activities that I realized the pertinence and 
relevance of this study. The participation in both selection processes gave me the 
opportunity to get acquainted with the entire process and to develop a critical analysis in 
order to improve it. 
Therefore, the Team and I defined this critical analysis in order to improve the fund 
selection process as one of the main objectives of the internship. At the same time, 
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during the internship I was another peer member of the team supporting in any task that 
was needed, contributing to the achievement of the department’s goals.  
To meet the objectives, it was extremely important the Team I was working with. They 
always looked at me as a colleague, contributing a lot to my performance as well as my 
growth at a professional level.  
At the end of the internship, I was invited to stay at Millennium bcp. I got the job and I 
am still currently working at WMU. 
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3. Fund selection criteria 
The process of fund selection is one of the main concerns of the WMU. Indeed, the 
Team has to ensure that it is being selected the mutual funds with the highest level of 
long term performance within the universe available, in the best interest of Millennium 
bcp’s clients. Therefore WMU needs to have got a suitable and reliable model to 
compute the greatest screening possible, i.e., the screening has to include all the relevant 
factors to compare a considerable amount of funds. It must provide the Team with the 
perfect view about what are the best and the worst ones. Therefore the process has to be 
carefully defined and thoroughly conducted. 
Many debates have been carried out and a number of studies have been published about 
the most relevant factors to identify skilled fund managers and the best mutual funds.   
However, there is no consensus over this issue in the investment funds’ environment. 
The opinions are slightly divergent. Globally, Barras et al. (2010) argued that some 
managers have skills that allow them to outperform the market, net of fees, but that 
distinguishing these skilled managers from those whose good performance is simply 
due to luck is very difficult to do. Therefore, this chapter reviews the literature on this 
topic, following Jones and Wermers (2011)’s classification of the general factors 
determining the process of identifying and evaluating the best skilled managers: (1) past 
performance, (2) macroeconomic timing, (3) fund manager characteristics and (4) fund 
holdings.  
 
3.1. Past performance  
If the best active managers have in fact superior information and analytical capabilities, 
the advantage should persist along the future. If so, the best managers who outperform 
the respective market in one period will likely outperform in the next period as well. 
The existence of performance persistence tells us whether past fund performance 
information should be taken into account by investors when making their investment 
decisions. In fact, performance persistence’s topic has consistently occupied a place to 
many debates.  
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The first studies on mutual fund performance persistence were already contradictory. 
Sharpe (1966) used the Sharpe ratio to measure fund performance. He ranked funds 
over two periods 1944-1953 and 1954-1963 and found a positive relationship between 
the two ranking periods. Conversely, Jensen (1968) measured the performance of 115 
mutual funds in the 1945-1964 period using the Jensen alpha measure and showed that 
they do not outperform on average a buy-and-hold strategy.  
Some evidence indicate that investment fund returns exhibit persistence but only when 
excess returns are adjusted to account for style biases by using both the Carhart (1997) 
four factor model or the Fama and French (1993) three factor model. For example, 
Harlow and Brown (2006) found that using style-adjusted returns can improve the odds 
of identifying an outperforming fund from 45 to 60 percent. Additionally, Pástor and 
Stambaugh (2002) suggested that adjusting for sector biases can improve those results 
even more.  
On the other hand, Kosowski et al. (2006) found that adjusting for non-normality in 
fund alphas increases the probabilities of finding funds with greater return persistence, 
distinguishing lucky managers from skilled managers. Kosowski et al. (2007) advanced 
further ahead and used this latter study in the universe of alternative funds, namely the 
hedge funds. They also found results that support the existence of persistence – top 
decile hedge funds outperformed bottom decile funds by 5.8 percent in the following 
year.  
Several studies suggest some significant advances on this topic such as Bers and 
Madura (2000) which found that closed-end funds (a publicly-traded fund that raises a 
fixed amount of capital through an IPO and it is then structured, listed and traded like a 
stock) exhibit return persistence. According to the study, the main reason for that is the 
unusual existence of inflows and outflows as it happens regularly in an open-ended 
fund.  Also Elton et al. (1995) found that past performance is predictive of future risk-
adjusted performance. Many other studies such as Grinblatt and Titman (1992), 
Zeckhauser et al. (1993) and Goetzmann and Ibbotson (1994) also found evidence of 
predictability at time horizons from one month to three years.   
All of these studies lend strong support to the conventional wisdom that the track record 
of a fund manager contains information about future performance.  
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Conversely, Barras et al. (2010) developed a simple technique to classify funds into 
skilled and unskilled funds. They exhibited a significant proportion of skilled funds 
prior to 1996 while this proportion rapidly decreased to an insignificant level of 0.6% in 
2006. This is consistent with the theoretical work of Berk et al. (2004) who showed that 
past performance cannot be used to infer skill level of fund managers. Phelps and Detzel 
(1997) found also no evidence of performance persistence.  
 
3.2. Macroeconomic timing  
Based on the analysis of past performance, it is also feasible to relate the funds’ 
performance with the macroeconomic environment in which the performance was 
achieved. Several studies analyzed this relation aiming to forecast which managers will 
be outperformers in a given macro environment in future.  To the extent that the alpha 
of the fund varies over time, according to Jones and Wermers (2011), this variation may 
be a consequence of three different events: (1) embedded macroeconomic sensitivities 
(for example, a persistent overweight in cyclical stocks), (2) time-varying skills, or (3) 
time-varying opportunities for managers to benefit from their skills. However, it seems 
to exist higher consensus regarding the third one – some periods in an economic cycle 
offer more mispricing opportunities for managers to take advantage of their superior 
insights and skills. The example illustrated by the authors is categorical: Many 
contrarian managers underperformed during the tech bubble of the late 1990s, when 
prices diverged significantly from fundamentals, but outperformed by a huge margin 
when the bubble burst.  
On the one hand, the study of Moskowitz (2000) suggest that the odds of the average 
active manager outperform the market are higher during periods of recession. On the 
other hand, Kosowski (2006) found that the average active funds do better in times of 
higher return dispersion and volatility, i.e., times of higher levels of uncertainty.   
These studies focused on fund performance during periods of instability in the 
economies such as stress, slowdowns and recessions. There are a lot of data frequently 
released by governmental and non-governmental entities which according to some 
studies may be very useful to investors when trying to predict future performance. 
Avramov and Wermers (2006) found a connection between macroeconomic variables 
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and outperformer funds. Actually, they identified good funds, in terms of 
outperformance, by using this approach. The macroeconomic variables that they have 
used in their study are: the level of short term rates, the credit default spread, the term 
structure of interest rates and the market’s dividend yield. According to them, selecting 
funds under this approach makes being possible to reach annual four factor alphas of 
more than 600 basis points, net of fees. Many others studies followed their 
methodology, achieving good results as well: Banegas et al. (2009) regarding European 
equity funds and Avramov et al. (2011) into the hedge fund universe. 
  
3.3. Fund and manager’s characteristics  
Studies in this area have also looked to specific characteristics of the fund, the asset 
management company and the fund managers.  
Asset management companies present different organizational structures, use different 
techniques and managers do not have all the same level of skills, both in collecting, 
gathering and analyzing information. Indeed, they are not all equal. Many studies found 
that some types of fund managers/asset management companies outperform on average.   
Regarding fund managers’ characteristics, Ding and Wermers (2005) found that 
experienced managers of large funds outperform less experienced managers. Cohen et 
al. (2007) found that managers that take larger exposure in companies in which they 
have some connection (for instances, family businesses; close relationship of friendship 
with some member of the board of directors; companies they have a considerable level 
of stake etc.) have higher probability of achieving outperformance. According to the 
study, the “connected holdings” do, on average, better than those non connected 
holdings. In fact, the stronger is the connection between the manager and the company, 
the better is the access to privileged information. Still regarding the manager’s 
characteristic, Chevalier and Ellison (1999) emphasized that managers who have 
graduated at schools with higher average SATs do better.  
De Souza and Gokcan (2003) documented that managers who invest in their own funds 
outperform. Indeed, the expression of “skin in the game” has been often cited by the 
literature. Most of investors like to see that, for example, the CEO of the companies in 
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which they are investing has a considerable stake in that company. The same can be 
applied to the mutual fund universe. In other words, in accordance with the study, if 
investors select funds from firms whose managers have the most skin in the game, they 
are substantially improving their odds of beating the market. Moreover, Kinnel (2015) 
examined a list of 500 funds and have discovered that funds whose managers have more 
than one million dollars invested had survived and beat the average of their peers over 
the past eight years.  
Other studies focused on the specific features of the asset management companies rather 
than their fund managers. Massa and Zhang (2009) found that funds managed by 
companies with a flat organization structure outperform funds managed by companies 
with more hierarchal structures. Kacperczyk et al. (2005) found that industry- or sector-
concentrated funds do better, suggesting that this specialization along sector or industry 
improves the manager’s ability to select, gather and analyze information.  
Lastly, some studies focused on the characteristics of the fund itself instead of focusing 
in the essence of the company or fund manager. Here stands out the study of Edelen 
(1999) and Kinnel (2010). The first one documented that funds with large cash balances 
are more likely to lag their benchmarks that other funds and the latter asserted that the 
cheapest funds, in terms of expense ratios, outperformed the most expensive funds in 
every period and every category. Lastly, Wermers (2012) found that funds with the 
most variation in style exposures do better in outperforming their benchmarks.  
 
3.4. Portfolio holdings  
According to many other financial researchers, a deeper analysis of the fund’s holdings 
is an interesting way to address when deciding about the best mutual fund to invest. 
Results seem to be quite promising. Jones and Wermers (2011) considered holdings-
based analysis as one of the best ways to identify the best managers and the best funds. 
Kacperczyk et al. (2008) compared the returns of the actual fund’s holdings with the 
returns of the publicly disclosed holdings of the fund. Here it is important to highlight 
the “window dressing” phenomena – when a manager tries to hide his bad trades in the 
fund. That difference is called as return gap. According to them, funds with large return 
gaps between published and holdings-derived performance underperform.  At the same 
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time, Wei et al. (2009) documented that contrarian managers outperform the managers 
who trade in the same direction as the aggregate of other managers (herding managers) 
by more than 2.6% a year.  
Lastly, Cremers and Petajisto (2009) and more recently Petajisto (2013) focused their 
study on an indicator called Active Share. This indicator measures how much an equity 
portfolio’s holdings differ from the benchmark index constituents. They found that 
funds that take bigger active positions outperform those with lowest levels of Active 
Share. According to both studies, the most active Stock Pickers have been able to add 
value for investors, beating their benchmarks indexes by about 126bps a year, net of 
fees. They also correlated that indicator with Tracking Error, finding that the most 
recommended approach (in terms of risk-return) involves picking funds with high 
Active Share and low Tracking Error. It means the fund is similarly exposed to the 
benchmark in terms of industries/sectors (low Tracking Error), but the fund manager is 
very selective, picking just some stocks as well as different stocks within each industry 
(high Active Share). Therefore, a higher Active Share, ceteris paribus, should allow a 
skilled manager the opportunity to add greater value.  
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4. WMU Equity Fund Selection Process 
In this section we present an analysis of the current selection process of WMU Fund 
Selection Team, aiming to improve it. We describe the different steps of the process as 
well as one selection that occurred during the internship – a selection of an Asia Pacific 
Ex Japan Equity Fund. Finally, we present some improvements that we suggest should 
be incorporated in the process. 
4.1. Analysis of the current selection process 
One of the main activities of WMU is to select the best performing mutual funds 
worldwide. An overview about the key global criteria used by WMU when selecting 
can be summarized as follows: 
 Process: they prefer actively-managed funds, i.e., funds that are managed by an 
individual manager, co-managers or a team of managers. Furthermore, the 
investment process of the fund must be understandable and make economic 
sense.  
 Philosophy: they prefer fundamental managers who exploit inefficiencies over 
the long term. 
 People: they prefer funds with stability of management and firm as well as 
stability of idea generators, namely analysts and portfolio managers. 
 Performance: they prefer funds with consistent positive risk adjusted returns 
over market cycles and the alpha generated must be related with the strategy 
implemented by the management team. 
These previous criteria are set by the Team to guarantee a disciplined selection process 
in order to protect investors as much as possible. According to the Team, a judicious 
selection process can add value but long term winners are not easily identifiable in 
advance. Here emerges the need to have a specialized team in selecting mutual funds. 
The selection process WMU carries out can be initially divided into two: quantitative 
screening and qualitative screening. 
Figure 3 shows the three main screenings that are done during the quantitative screening 
stage of the process. All of these screenings are computed using Morningstar database. 
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Morningstar is a research tool which provides data on approximately 473,000 
investment offerings, including stocks, mutual funds and similar vehicles. So the Team 
only considers funds with at least 3-year strategy/team track record, with historical 
outperformance relative to index and suitable fund size. Furthermore, the Team sees as 
important that a fund has similar characteristics to the index that best fits it. For 
example, if they are selecting an US large cap equity fund, they want a fund similar to 
the MSCI USA Index. Thus, the fund should have a beta between 0.75 and 1.25, a 
correlation of more than 0.75 and a Tracking Error below 15%. However, all these 
defined thresholds are flexible and are always depending on the market conditions in 
which the selection is taking place. Lastly, they look to the funds with superior 
performance and risk factors over a full market cycle.  
Figure 3. Selection Process - Quantitative Screening 
 
Source: Millennium bcp Private Banking 
Globally, after analyzing track record, fund size and correlation to the index, the Team 
looks to risk-return indicators to choose which funds go to the second part of the 
process.  
Figure 4 shows the second part of the process – the qualitative screening. In this stage, 
the Team firstly send a questionnaire to the fund providers of the funds who passed the 
previous screening. This questionnaire is named RFI (request for information) and 
contains detailed questions to understand the fund’s investment process, management 
team, philosophy, strategy etc. After analyzing the answers given by the fund providers, 
the process goes to the next stage. In the second part of the qualitative screening, the 
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Team meets with the portfolio manager of the funds which has passed the previous 
stage in order to confirm the RFI details as well as any other questions that have arisen. 
Normally, only around 3 or 4 funds reach this last phase.  
Figure 4. Selection Process - Qualitative Screening 
 
Source: Millennium bcp Private Banking 
 
Finally, everything analyzed, the Team chooses the fund which has fitted more its 
requisites. One fund is selected. 
During the internship, two new selections were carried out.  We briefly describe the 
selection of an Asia Pacific Ex Japan Equity fund
1
. This selection was developed 
because the Asia Pacific Ex Japan Equity fund in the list of recommended funds at that 
time was consistently underperforming its benchmark index and its peer group. Thus the 
team decided to select a new one.  
                                                 
1
 Asia Pacific Ex Japan Equity Fund means an equity fund whose portfolio comprises companies of the 
western Pacific Ocean’s region such as East Asia, Southeast Asia, South Asia and Oceania, excluding 
Japan. 
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Exhibit 1. Morningstar's short list - Asia Pacific Ex Japan equity fund selection 
 
Source: Morningstar (November 2014) 
 
Exhibit 1 shows a short-list of 12 funds, ordered by 3 years’ past return, obtained from 
Morningstar. As previously explained, all funds on the list were assessed, taking into 
account the quantitative screening stage of the process. Furthermore, during this stage, 
the Team also analyzed some reports provided by Morningstar with more detailed 
information about the funds as fund’s characteristics, fund’s holdings, portfolio 
manager, expenses and many other statistics. 
Looking to the list, we see firstly the First State Asian Equity Plus fund. This fund has a 
high track record, as its inception date was in 2003, a suitable fund size and a brilliant 
performance. However, the fund was soft closed at that time, meaning that additional 
inflows are only allowed to current investors and not to new ones. That is normally the 
case of funds that reach a big size. The second fund in the list is the Schroder ISF Asian 
Equity Yield fund. This fund was also removed from the short-list, since it was also soft 
closed. BGF Asia Pacific Equity fund is the following fund in the list. Looking to the 
main indicators, the fund seemed to be a good candidate. However, the team knew that 
the portfolio manager had left the team in February 2014. According to the WMU 
criteria described before, this is a sufficient reason to exclude the fund from the process. 
Actually, it makes much sense. Since the portfolio manager had left the team, a new one 
took his place. However, the Team does not know if the philosophy and strategy of the 
previous one will remain the same with the new one managing the fund.  
Another fund which was automatically removed from the list was the Mirae Asset Asia 
Sector Leader Equity fund, the last placed in the list. Its inception date had been May 
2013. Once again, according to the criteria used by WMU, a fund is only available to be 
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selected when has more than 3 years of track record. However, if the fund has no more 
than 3 years but its strategy is older, it can be actually chosen. But it was not the case for 
Mirae Fund and therefore it was taken off the list. Once again, it is also a prudent 
measure as a way to ensure that the decisions are sufficiently supported by 
representative historical information. In fact, analyzing a fund with less than three years 
of track record is not enough to formulate a well-founded opinion.  
Another issue in the short-list relates to Fidelity and Henderson Horizon funds - both 
funds are biased to companies that usually distribute dividends or have a high 
probability of doing it in the future. Actually, the Team does not want funds with that 
bias, so they were also removed. As mentioned before, the Team prefers funds that their 
philosophy is to find opportunities in the market by companies’ fundamental analysis 
rather than their probability of distributing dividends. In fact, this also makes sense. The 
fact of a company distributes dividends does not mean the company is solid and is well-
managed. Furthermore, companies that are known by their characteristic of distributing 
dividends are highly exposed to negative market movements whenever they cannot 
comply with the distribution expectations. 
After an overall analysis, the Team identified the funds in the short-list to proceed to 
next step of the process. Those funds were: 
 Investec GSF Asia Pacific Equity 
 AB Asia Pacific Ex Japan Equity 
 JPM Asia Pacific Strategic Equity  
The final step consists of a qualitative screening of the three funds. The Team sent the 
RFI to the management firms of the finalist funds and met the management team of the 
three funds. The final decision is taken based on the analysis of the feedback, both from 
the answers to the RFI and the meeting and this time has favoured JPM Asia Pacific 
Strategic Equity fund. The fund was selected and the Team started to recommend the 
fund for clients who seek exposure to Asia Pacific Ex Japan equity market. 
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4.2. Proposed improvements 
Analyzing the selection, we had opportunity to look carefully to the entire process. 
Actually, we saw it critically and we concluded it can be improved. 
Our first suggestion goes to the correlation with the index. According to the criteria 
mentioned before, WMU prefer funds with a correlation to its benchmark index higher 
than 0.75. Although this threshold can be adjusted, the concern of the Team is that the 
fund follows the index closely. However, one of the main objectives of the Team is to 
select funds which are consistent outperformers. These two conditions seem incoherent. 
Therefore, we think they should not include this characteristic as a criteria. Taking into 
account fees and expenses, the higher the correlation to the index, the higher the 
probability of the actively-managed fund underperform the index, net of fees. This is 
what WMU does not intend. We think that correlation should be a matter to analyze 
further ahead in the process. It should not be a criteria used in the first steps of the 
screening, since the Team could initially eliminate good funds, simply because they 
have a lower degree of correlation with the index. We think that this is a question to 
analyze when WMU sends the questionnaire RFI. Only in that stage, it should be 
analyzed whether the fund is consistent in its process and philosophy as well as 
disciplined with a benchmark aware strategy.  
Our second suggestion relates to all phases of the selection process. In almost every 
selection, more than one fund passes to the last phases of the process. However, at the 
end of the line only one fund is selected. We think that the Team should create a “pool” 
of the funds that go to the last phase of the process but are not selected for some reason. 
This would be valuable information to take into account the next time the Team would 
need to select another new fund. We think this can improve the efficiency of the 
selection process.  
We also think that additional indicators could be considered in the quantitative 
screening phases. Sortino and Van Der Meer (1991) and Appel (2005) highlighted the 
relevance of considering sortino ratio and drawdown measure, respectively, when 
assessing mutual funds. Drawdown measures the gradual decline in the price of a fund 
between its highest and lowest value over a given period while sortino ratio is a risk-
adjusted return indicator which only penalizes “harmful” volatility. As regular standard 
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deviation does not discriminate between up and down volatility, sortino ratio measures 
only the part of the standard deviation that in fact matters for investors – the downside 
risk. Since upside volatility is usually good, sortino ratio measures the actual level of 
risk the portfolio is taking in fact– the higher the sortino ratio, the better the portfolio 
has performed relative to the risk taken. On the other hand, drawdown risk becomes 
more and more relevant to investors. Some funds are able to recoup their losses much 
more quickly than others, and this can be a key indicator of how well the fund is 
managed. For example, a fund that can lose over half of its value in a short time and 
take years to recoup this is probably not very well managed. Therefore, we think that 
these two indicators must also be carefully analyzed whenever the Team initiates a fund 
selection. 
Moreover, we think Active Share should also be considered by the Team when 
assessing mutual funds in the quantitative screening stage. As previously mentioned, 
Cremers and Petajisto (2009) proposed Active Share as a new factor of active 
management. Since the authors found compelling arguments to prove its predictive 
power, we decided to study Active Share deeply in order to see whether we find statistic 
relevance that allow us to agree with them. 
Finally, we sent a questionnaire (see appendix 1) to three different asset management 
companies – Fidelity, Schroders and Pictet - in an attempt to understand their views 
regarding the indicators they think to be fundamental when comparing funds in the 
same asset class. After analyzing the answers given by them at question 1, we realized 
that understanding if the attribution of returns fits the stated philosophy and investment 
process of the fund, stability of the team, managers’ alignment with clients (i.e., 
whether managers’ performance drives a large part of their compensation and whether 
they invest in the fund alongside clients) and risk-adjusted returns over a three and five 
year cycle are examples of what they see as important measures to assess a mutual 
fund/portfolio manager. Actually, the Team looks carefully for these topics whenever a 
new fund is selected. Good news for WMU. 
On the same questionnaire, we also inserted two questions asking their views regarding 
Active Share. Reading all answers, we see that all three firms agree when saying Active 
Share, although being not a guarantee for future outperformance, is an important and 
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relevant indicator when selecting from a universe of active equity funds. Schroders says 
that clearly a fund needs to be different to its benchmark index in order to outperform it 
and Active Share gives that notion. Schroders says also that Active Share is becoming 
more prevalent in the industry as something that investors are paying attention to. 
Besides Schroders’ point of view, Pictet asserts Active Share is one indicator that can be 
useful, particularly if we are comparing managers who state that a large proportion of 
their alpha contribution will come from a high conviction bottom-up approach while 
Fidelity says Active Share contribute to a fuller picture of active management.  
In the next chapter, we develop a study which aims to test the ability of Active Share to 
predict future outperformance. It will be presented the relevance of investigating Active 
Share, the objectives of the study, the methodology, the database and the selected 
sample as well as all the steps carried out during the study.  
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5. Testing Active Share 
In this chapter we present our study of testing Active Share.  
The main objective of this study is to conclude whether Active Share should be taken 
into account in the selection process of a new equity mutual fund or not. If we can find 
compelling arguments to do so, this can be one additional improvement to suggest to 
WMU. In fact, this is what all of this project intends to do.  
Furthermore, as the literature shows relevant findings in this topic, we think that 
studying Active Share not only in the US but also in the Eurozone as well as in a 
different time period of Petajisto (2013) we could find innovative conclusions.  
Looking to the answers given by Fidelity, Schroders and Pictet (see appendix 1) we 
actually realize Active Share has been increasingly approached within the mutual fund 
industry. This fact together with the encouragement received by WMU as well as our 
purpose to improve the selection process was enough for us to be sure that it would be 
interesting and useful to test it. Since the Team does not look to Active Share when 
selecting mutual funds and existing studies find evidence that Active Share is a 
predictive tool to identify the most probable outperformers in the future, we decided to 
study it deeply.  
The next sub sections will be divided as follows: the measure and its interpretation, data 
and sample selection and lastly the methodology carried out. 
 
5.1. The measure and its interpretation 
As previously mentioned, Active Share is a metric proposed firstly by Cremers and 
Petajisto (2009) and more recently by Petajisto (2013) to measure the percentage of the 
mutual fund’s portfolio that differs from the passive benchmark index. A passively-
managed portfolio consists of replicating the return on an index with a strategy that 
holds almost all (or even all) the stocks held by the index, in the same proportions. 
Conversely, actively-managed portfolios are defined as everything which deviates from 
passive management. Actively-managed mutual funds are funds, as the name implies, 
which are daily managed by a skilled professional specialist(s) – called portfolio 
manager/management team. Active equity managers normally buy and select stocks in 
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order to achieve a particular goal, such as providing a certain level of return or beating a 
relevant benchmark. As a result, they trade much more frequently than managers of 
passively managed funds whose goal is to mirror the performance of the index the fund 
tracks. However, it is difficult to investors measure the degree of active management the 
fund comprises. To try to solve this problem, both studies started by defining two 
different measures that will accompany the entire study: Tracking Error and Active 
Share.  
Kahn and Grinold (1999) defined Tracking Error as the time series standard deviation of 
the difference between a fund return (       ) and its benchmark index return (        ) 
as follows: 
                                        
Therefore, Tracking Error measures the volatility of the fund that is not explained by 
movements in the fund’s benchmark index. 
Cremers and Petajisto (2009) designed Active Share which they characterized as a 
simple way to quantify active management through comparing the holdings of a mutual 
fund with the holdings of its benchmark index. They defined it as follows (where 
        is the weight of stock i in the fund’s portfolio and          is the weight of the 
same stock in the fund’s benchmark index): 
             
 
 
                   
According to Cremers and Petajisto (2009) and Petajisto (2013), Active Share helps 
investors to quantify active management as it compares the holdings of a mutual fund 
with the holdings of its benchmark index. 
Both Active Share and Tracking Error are thus two different measures to evaluate the 
degree of active management. Conceptually, when comparing a fund with its 
benchmark index, an active manager can only add value through stock selection and/or 
market timing. Stock selection consists of taking active bets on individual stocks while 
market timing consists of time-varying bets on broader factor portfolios. In practice, 
when a fund manager selects only one stock within a given sector, he is clearly putting 
in practice his stock selection skill. Whenever a fund manager is overweight to a 
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specific sector or country, for instances, he is trying to add value by a factor timing bet. 
However, although both stock selection and market timing (also known as stock picking 
and tactical asset allocation) give us an insight of active management, they are in fact 
different concepts. Petajisto (2013) demonstrates a practical example which shows the 
difference. Considering a portfolio with 50 stocks, it seems to be well diversified. 
However, if all the overweight positions of the portfolio are in the technology sector, 
even small active positions will generate a high Tracking Error. Theoretically, 
technology stocks, as most of the stocks within a particular sector, tend to move 
together in the same direction. Conversely, considering an index which comprises 50 
industries with 20 stocks each, if a portfolio picks only 1 stock out of 20 in each 
industry, it will hold 50 stocks and the overall sector positioning of the fund will be the 
same of the benchmark index. The manager is thus very selective within sectors, 
generating a high Active Share. However, since he is not taking any active positions 
across industries, the portfolio will produce a low Tracking Error.  
In this sense, despite both measure active management, Active Share and Tracking 
Error evaluate two different aspects. Active Share evaluates the manager’s stock 
picking skill while Tracking Error is a proxy for systematic factor risk. Figure 5 shows 
the different categories of active management sorted by Petajisto (2013). 
Figure 5. Different types of Active Management 
 
Source: Petajisto (2013) 
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Figure 5
1
 plots 4 different types of mutual funds simply by the combination between 
Active Share and Tracking Error. Diversified stock picks (hereinafter Stock Pickers) 
characterize the funds with higher Active Share and low Tracking Error. Concentrated 
stock picks (hereinafter Concentrated funds) combine high levels on both Active Share 
and Tracking Error. Factor Bets are defined as funds with low Active Share but high 
Tracking Error while closet indexing (hereinafter Closet Indexers funds) gives respect 
to the funds with low levels on both Active Share and Tracking Error. Following this 
distinction, the author believes it is meaningfully distinguished the different active 
management styles. 
Therefore: 
 Stock picker: the fund’s sector weights are similar to those of the 
benchmark (low Tracking Error) but the manager focuses on finding 
individual underpriced stocks within each sector through his stock picking 
skill (high Active Share). 
 Factor bet: the fund’s sector weights are different to those of the benchmark 
(high Tracking Error) and its philosophy does not go too much through stock 
picking (low Active Share). 
 Concentrated: the fund follows not only a stock picking strategy (high 
Active Share) but also factor bets (high Tracking Error). The fund takes large 
active positions both on individual stocks and sector weightings. 
 Closet indexer: the fund do not engage much in either stock selection or 
factor bets strategies (low Active Share and low Tracking Error). 
Traditionally the most common way that people measure the degree of active 
management is to use Tracking Error, which is a returns-based way of measuring active 
management. However, the authors think their way of quantifying active management 
would be a useful compliment to Tracking Error but it is inherently better. Both 
Cremers and Petajisto (2009) and Petajisto (2013) found that active management, as 
measured by Active Share, significantly predicts fund performance relative to the 
benchmark. Funds with the highest Active Share outperform their benchmark both 
                                                 
1
  Petajisto (2013) defines, apart from the ones showed in the figure 5, another category during his 
article – Moderately Active funds. 
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before and after expenses while funds with the lowest Active Share underperform after 
expenses. Conversely, they concluded active management as measured by Tracking 
Error does not predict higher returns. 
In our study, since Petajisto (2013) achieved relevant findings in his study, we will 
follow Petajisto (2013) with a few exceptions that will be examined hereafter. Our study 
will comprise both US and Eurozone mutual funds, from January 2000 to December 
2014.   
 
5.2. Data and sample selection 
In our study, we needed information of both Active Share and Tracking Error. To get 
this information we used the database Morningstar, through the available access at 
Millennium bcp.  
Being aware of the availability of Active Share and Tracking Error via Morningstar, we 
advanced thus for the next step: selecting a sample of mutual funds. To select the funds 
we used also the Morningstar database, computing a screening according to the 
following criteria: 
 Morningstar category: US large-cap blend equity funds; US large-cap value 
equity funds; US large-cap growth funds; US mid-cap equity funds; US 
small-cap equity funds; US flex-cap equity funds 
 Base currency: US dollar 
 Distribution status: Accumulation2 
 Oldest share class: Yes 
 Fund size: higher than $10M 
Computing this screening, we achieved 277 US mutual funds
3
.  
The screening criteria above were globally the same of Petajisto (2013). The only 
exception is the oldest share class. While we defined it at the beginning, Petajisto 
                                                 
2
 The distribution status “Accumulation” means the fund reinvests any dividend distributed within the 
portfolio.  
3
 Although we called US mutual funds, it does not necessarily mean a fund domiciled in the United 
States, but instead funds which their investment universe comprises the US stock market.  
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(2013) computed the value-weighted average of monthly returns for funds with multiple 
share classes.  
After the screening regarding US mutual funds, we computed the same research criteria 
for Eurozone funds with two differences: base currency switched from dollar to euro 
and the Morningstar categories changed from US to Eurozone. We achieved 283 funds 
with data of Active Share and Tracking Error. 
All the calculations regarding Active Share and Tracking Error were done, through 
Morningstar, against the funds’ primary prospectus benchmark. Whenever a fund had 
not available its primary prospectus benchmark, we chose the index which produced the 
lowest average Active Share (called best fit index at Morningstar) or the Morningstar’s 
defined benchmark for its respective category. For example, if a US large-cap blend 
equity fund had not published its primary prospectus benchmark and Morningstar could 
not define the best fit index, we chose the Morningstar category index for US large-cap 
blend equity funds which is Russell 1000 index.  
From Morningstar we exported annual data on Active Share and Tracking Error, from 
2000 to 2014. We obtained data on Active Share as of the last day of each year as well 
as 1-year Tracking Error, both from 2000 to 2014.  
Regarding funds’ and benchmark indices’ returns, we obtained data on monthly returns 
from Bloomberg platform. Since some mutual funds had not available their price series 
within Bloomberg, we were forced to reduce our sample. We finally obtained 205 US 
mutual funds and 270 Eurozone mutual funds (see appendix 2 – list of mutual funds 
used in the study).  Comparing our sample with the one used by Petajisto (2013) we see 
ours is smaller. We were not capable to reach a bigger sample, because Morningstar 
does not have much funds with available Active Share yet. 
In the US study, we used the benchmarks Russell 1000, Russell 1000 Value, Russell 
1000 Growth, Russell 2000, Russell 2000 Value, Russell 3000, Russell Midcap, Russell 
Midcap Value, Russell Midcap Growth, S&P 500, S&P 500 Value, S&P 600, S&P 100, 
MSCI USA, MSCI North America, FTSE USA and Dow Jones Industrial Average, all 
of those returns included dividends and were expressed in dollar terms. In the Eurozone 
study, we used the benchmarks MSCI EMU, MSCI EMU Mid, MSCI EMU Mid Value, 
MSCI EMU Smid, MSCI EMU Smallcap, MSCI Europe, MSCI Europe ex UK, MSCI 
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Euro and MSCI Pan Euro, all of their returns also included dividends and were 
expressed in euro terms. 
 
5.3.  Methodology 
On this sub section, we will focus on the methodology carried out to test the predictive 
power of Active Share.  
Firstly, we sorted all mutual funds into the five categories of active management defined 
before: Closet Indexers, Factor Bets, Moderately Active, Concentrated and Stock 
Pickers funds. The division was exactly the same of Petajisto (2013) and the 
combination (Tracking Error versus Active Share) was defined as the following matrix: 
 
Exhibit 2. Combination Active Share - Tracking Error 
 
Source: Petajisto (2013) 
Exhibit 2 shows the matrix of possible combinations between Active Share and 
Tracking Error. We sorted mutual funds into the above categories on an annual basis. 
Each year, we divided the funds’ Active Share and Tracking Error into quintiles and 
then we labelled them. The 1
st
 quintile of Active Share comprised the funds with the 
lowest Active Share in the year while the 5
th
 quintile comprised the funds with the 
highest value. Similarly, the 1
st
 quintile of Tracking Error included the funds with the 
lowest value of Tracking Error in the respective year whilst the 5
th
 quintile included the 
funds with the highest Tracking Error. According to that, if a fund in a given year 
ranked 1
st
 quintile in Active Share range and ranked 1
st
 quintile of Tracking Error, we 
labelled the fund “Closet Indexer” in that year. Conversely, if a fund ranked 5th quintile 
of Active Share and 5
th
 quintile of Tracking Error, we labelled it “Concentrated”. 
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Following the matrix on exhibit 2, we found annually in which category each fund 
belonged. 
The annual distribution of our samples, both the US and the Eurozone, across the 
different categories is expressed in appendix 3.  
After the division has been done, we focused on the core part of the study, the part of 
knowing how the performance varies across the different categories of actively-
managed funds. In this stage we defined 5 different portfolios: portfolio P1 held Closet 
Indexers funds, portfolio P2 held Factor Bets funds, portfolio P3 held Moderately 
Active funds, portfolio P4 held Concentrated funds and portfolio P5 held Stock Pickers 
funds. Therefore, every fund was annually channelled to the portfolio it belonged in that 
year.  
Thereafter, we calculated the equal-weighted average returns for the 5 portfolios as well 
as the equal-weighted average across all groups. These calculations were done in a 
monthly basis. We achieved the monthly return of each portfolio from January 2000 to 
December 2014. Therefore, portfolios’ monthly returns comprised the equal-weighted 
average returns of the living funds belonging to the portfolio’s category in each month. 
As we were going forward in time, each portfolio comprised more funds since some 
funds in the sample were launched after 2000. Finally, we calculated the annualized 
return of each portfolio for the 15-year period from 2000 to 2014. 
We did exactly the same for benchmarks. Whenever a fund was channelled to a given 
portfolio, its respective benchmark followed the same path within the benchmarks’ 
portfolios. For instance, if a fund was Stock Picker in one year, its benchmark went to 
the portfolio of Stock Pickers’ benchmark in the same year. The benchmarks’ portfolios 
were also computed on the same way as well as their monthly returns. We also 
calculated the annualized return of each portfolio of benchmarks for the period. 
We highlight that, as we sorted funds annually, a fund could be Closet Indexer in one 
year and Factor Bet in the following year, for example. It could happen in every fund, 
every year. 
Therefore, we ended with 5 portfolios of funds (P1, P2, P3, P4 e P5) and 5 portfolios of 
benchmarks, both for the US and the Eurozone. For each of these 10 portfolios we 
calculated the annualized return for the 15-year period from January 2000 to December 
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2014. After that, we compared the returns of each portfolio of funds with their 
respective portfolio of benchmarks in order to get benchmark-adjusted returns. Finally, 
we regressed the monthly benchmark-adjusted returns on the four factor model of 
Carhart (1997) to control for exposure to the market, size, value and momentum effects. 
These regressions allowed us to obtain the average annual alpha delivered from each 
portfolio of funds.  
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6. Results 
In this section we present the empirical results of our study.  
Exhibit 3 shows some sample statistics for the fund groups. For each sample, we 
computed an equal-weighted mean across all the months. Fund size is the only 
exception as the presented values in its column are expressed as of August 2015. 
 
Exhibit 3. Sample Statistics for Fund Categories, 2000-2014 
US Mutual Funds 
Mean values 
     
Category Label 
No. of 
funds 
Active Share Tracking Error 
Fund Size 
(millions) 
5 Stock Pickers 23 95,3% 5,0% $281 
4 Concentrated 19 96,3% 8,9% $590 
3 Factor Bets 22 82,8% 8,0% $375 
2 Moderately Active 101 78,7% 4,7% $458 
1 Closet Indexers 40 37,3% 2,2% $718 
All 
 
205 74,5% 5,0% $493 
      
Eurozone Mutual Funds 
Mean values 
     
Category Label 
No. of 
funds 
Active Share Tracking Error 
Fund Size 
(millions) 
5 Stock Pickers 23 89,8% 5,8% 123 € 
4 Concentrated 32 92,2% 9,3% 79 € 
3 Factor Bets 21 71,9% 8,7% 103 € 
2 Moderately Active 141 65,1% 4,4% 236 € 
1 Closet Indexers 53 34,2% 2,6% 231 € 
All 
 
270 64,9% 5,1% 196 € 
Notes: this table shows sample statistics for the fund categories defined in exhibit 2. The values in this table are 
equal-weighted means of each variable computed across all months over the sample period. 
 
Our samples have thus a total of 205 US and 270 Eurozone mutual funds each. Exhibit 
3 shows also the means regarding Active Share, Tracking Error and fund size. Within 
the Eurozone sample, the average Active Share among Stock Pickers is 89.8% while 
Tracking Error is 5.8%. Regarding the US sample, Active Share among Stock Pickers 
averages 95.3% while Tracking Error averages 5.0%. All merged, we see the average 
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fund has 64.9% and 74.5% of Active Share within the Eurozone and the US samples, 
respectively. 
Exhibit 4 shows the annualized net returns, the annualized benchmark-adjusted returns 
and the annualized four-factor alphas
1
 for the 5 portfolios of US all-equity mutual 
funds. We also computed the same calculations without distinguishing among groups, 
meaning the average fund across all groups.  
Exhibit 4. US – Fund Performance, January 2000 – December 2014 
 
Fund Net 
Returns 
Benchmark-adjusted 
Returns 
Four Factor 
Alphas 
Closet Indexers (P1) 2,92% -2,53%*** -1,85%*** 
  
(-4,21) (-3,95) 
Factor Bets (P2) 4,03% -0,78% -1,05% 
  
(-0,28) (-0,72) 
Moderately Active (P3) 4,78% -0,96%* -0,92%** 
  
(-1,40) (-1,82) 
Concentrated (P4) 6,73% -0,42% 0,16% 
  
(-0,07) (0,09) 
Stock Pickers (P5) 7,07% 0,89% 0,41% 
  
(0,98) (0,57) 
Total 5,12% -0,91% -0,87%* 
  
(-1,13) (-1,43) 
P5 - P1 4,15%*** 3,42%*** 2,27%*** 
 
(3,03) (3,55) (2,55) 
Notes: Exhibit 4 shows the annualized equal-weighted performance of US all-equity mutual funds for five types of active 
management (defined in exhibit 3). The numbers are expressed in US dollars and in percent per year, followed by t-statistics 
(numbers in parenthesis). ***, ** and * indicate statistical significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% level. 
 
When computing the four factor model of Carhart (1997), we see the average fund 
delivered a negative alpha of -0.87% (t=-1.43). According to that, we note the average 
fund was not able to add value for investors.  
Looking at the different portfolios, we found that the difference in the net returns 
between Closet Indexers and Stock Pickers is 4.15% (t=3.03). We computed one tailed 
t-statistics to test if the difference between both differs significantly. We concluded the 
observed difference between both portfolios in terms of net returns is convincing 
enough to say that the average net return between Stock Pickers and Closet Indexers 
                                                 
1
 Four factor alphas were obtained through the four-factor model of Carhart (1997) 
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differs significantly. Therefore, we conclude Stock Pickers funds produce higher net 
returns that Closet Indexers funds, on average. 
Adjusting for benchmark returns, we found that Closet Indexers funds delivered 
strongly negative relative returns (-2.53%) which allow us to say the Closer Indexers 
underperform on average their benchmarks after fees (t=-4.21). Comparing Stock 
Pickers and Closet Indexers in terms of benchmark-adjusted returns, we once again 
conclude Stock Pickers post much higher excess returns than Closet Indexers (3.42%) 
and the positive difference is also statistically significant at the 1% level (t=3.55). 
Therefore, we conclude that Stock Pickers funds deliver, on average, superior excess 
returns than the Closet Indexers in the US space. Regarding all the remaining portfolios, 
we did not achieve statistically significant results to conclude they are different from 
zero. 
The right column of exhibit 4 represents the alpha values of each portfolio when we 
regress the monthly benchmark-adjusted returns on the four factor model of Carhart 
(1997). Controlling for exposure to the market, size, value and momentum factors, we 
see once again that Closet Indexers add the least (-1.85%). Alphas for Moderately 
Active are also statistically significant (t=-1.82), posting -0.92%. The difference 
between alphas on Stock Pickers and Closet Indexers is once again statistically 
significant (t=3.33). Alpha generated by Stock Pickers was 2.27% higher than the one 
delivered by Closet Indexers. 
In fact, exhibit 4 shows Stock Pickers deliver higher returns, higher benchmark-adjusted 
returns and higher alphas than the Closet Indexers portfolio. Moreover, the differences 
are statistically significant which supports the theory achieved by Petajisto (2013). We 
also achieved statistically significant results in respect to Closet Indexers portfolio. We 
found that Closet Indexers post on average negative returns, both absolute and 
benchmark-adjusted, as well as negative alphas. These findings are also consistent with 
the ones achieved by Petajisto (2013). However, in contrast to Petajisto (2013), we did 
not find relevant results to argue Stock Pickers deliver the highest benchmark-adjusted 
return and alpha. 
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Exhibit 5 presents the same analysis for Eurozone funds. It also shows the equal-
weighted average returns, the benchmark-adjusted returns and the four-factor alphas for 
the five portfolios of funds within the Eurozone universe. 
 
Exhibit 5. Eurozone - Fund Performance, January 2000 – December 2014 
  
Fund Net 
Returns 
Benchmark-adjusted 
Returns 
Four Factor 
Alphas 
Closet Indexers (P1) -1,29% -2,25%*** -1,66%*** 
    (-3,43) (-3,56) 
Factor Bets (P2) 0,49% -1,21% -0,85% 
    (-0,62) (-0,76) 
Moderately Active (P3) 0,69% -0,63% -0,60% 
    (-0,67) (-1,01) 
Concentrated (P4) 2,80% -0,08% 0,56% 
    (0,03) (0,60) 
Stock Pickers (P5) 3,22% 0,23% 0,43% 
    (0,23) (0,27) 
Total 0,99% -0,45% -0,56% 
    (-0,82) (-0,92) 
P5 - P1 4,51%*** 2,48%* 2,13%* 
  (3,01) (1,38) (1,30)  
Notes: Exhibit 5 shows the annualized equal-weighted performance of Eurozone all-equity mutual funds for five types of active 
management (defined in exhibit 3). The numbers are expressed in euro terms and in percent per year, followed by t-statistics 
(numbers in parenthesis).  ***, ** and * indicate statistical significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% level. 
 
Looking at the exhibit 5, we did not find anything new that we have not found before 
when we analyzed the performance among the US sample. We found once again 
evidence to conclude Closet Indexers funds underperformed their benchmarks after fees 
- they delivered an annualized benchmark-adjusted return of -2.25% (t=-3.43) and -
1.66% of four factor alpha (t=-3.56). 
The difference in net returns and benchmark-adjusted returns between Closet Indexers 
and Stock Pickers was 4.51% (t=3.01) and 2.48% (t=1.38), respectively. Therefore, also 
in the Eurozone space, we found that Stock Pickers delivered higher absolute and 
benchmark-adjusted returns than those who closely track the index. 
Regressing the benchmark-adjusted returns on the four factor model of Carhart (1997), 
we observe that all obtained alphas are not statistically significant, except for Closet 
Indexers. Once again, we see this portfolio of funds delivered negative alphas. As 
previously, we also investigated whether the difference between alphas on Stock 
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Pickers and Closet Indexers is statistically significant or not. We found statistical 
significance at the 1% level (t=1.30). 
Overall, exhibit 5 shows Stock Pickers deliver on average higher returns than the ones 
delivered from Closet Indexers portfolio whose returns are consistently negatives. When 
comparing these results with the previous ones regarding US mutual funds, we did not 
find anything relevant beyond what was already concluded before.  
Petajisto (2013) concluded that Stock Pickers are able to add value for investors as they 
outperform on average their benchmark indexes. Petajisto (2013) also found that Factor 
Bets, as indicated by high Tracking Error, are not rewarded in the market. In our study, 
results are not robust enough to conclude this. However, one thing we think to be clear: 
Closet Indexers are not a good choice for investors who seek outperformer funds. 
Whenever considering fees and expenses, these funds will consistently underperform 
their benchmarks. In this sense, we conclude WMU should select funds away from the 
ones which closely track benchmark indexes. Actually, Closet Indexers funds are the 
ones with small amounts of Active Share, since they place at the 1
st
 quintile of Active 
Share (where 5
th
 is the quintile with the highest Active Share). Therefore, we are able to 
suggest WMU to avoid these funds when selecting mutual funds.  
Besides all tests computed before, a recent non-published working paper by Frazzini et 
al. (2015) concludes that small-cap funds
2
 tend to have higher Active Share while large-
cap funds tend to have lower Active Share. We analyzed our US sample and noted that 
indeed 97% of the Closet Indexers are large-cap biased funds. As such, we decided to 
remove this bias from the sample and we computed exactly the same study but now 
without the small-caps funds within both samples. However, we found no changes in 
our findings.  
Lastly, we analyzed the correlation between Active Share (and Tracking Error) and 
performance, by single regressing mutual funds’ benchmark-adjusted performance with 
Active Share and Tracking Error, respectively. Here we do not combine both, since our 
intention is to analyze each metric separately.  
 
                                                 
2
 Small-cap funds typically invest in companies with market capitalization of less than 1 million 
dollars/euros. 
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Exhibit 6. Predictive regressions for fund performance, 2000-2014 
 
US Mutual Funds Eurozone Mutual Funds 
Active Share 0,0012* 0,0021*** 
 
1,61 3,51 
Active Share x Large Cap 0,0001 0,0025*** 
 
0,23 4,28 
Active Share x Small/Mid Cap 0,0079* -0,0036 
 
1,29 -0,52 
Tracking Error 0,0107* 0,0116** 
 
1,50 2,29 
Notes: ***, ** and * indicate statistical significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% level, respectively. 
 
Exhibit 6 tries to explain fund performance with the explanatory variables Active Share 
and Tracking Error. Here we calculated the average return, the average Active Share 
and the average Tracking Error of each fund in both samples from January 2000 to 
December 2014. With this, we intended to analyze further how Active Share and 
Tracking Error are related with fund performance.  
Looking at exhibit 6, we see that 1pp increase in Active Share predicts 0.12 basis points 
increase in US funds’ excess return (t=1.61) while among small and midcap funds this 
increase is a bit higher – 1pp increase in Active Share predicts 0.79 basis points in 
funds’ excess return (t=1.29). At the same time, in contrast to Petajisto (2013), 1pp 
increase in Tracking Error predicts around 1.1 basis points in funds’ benchmark-
adjusted returns (t=1.50). 
Regarding the Eurozone, we found that a 1pp increase in Active Share predicts a 0.21 
basis points increase in fund’s excess return (t=3.51). Furthermore, we found that 
among large cap funds, 1pp increase in Active Share predicts 0.25 basis points in fund’s 
adjusted-benchmark return (t=4.28). Once again, conversely to Petajisto (2013), we 
found that 1pp increase in Tracking Error predicts around 1.2 basis points increase in 
Eurozone mutual funds.   
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7. Conclusions 
This report has two different objectives. Firstly, it aims to present the nature of the 
internship at Millennium bcp Private Banking, Fund Selection Team. Secondly, it 
intends to make a critical analysis of the equity fund selection process of WMU in order 
to identify where it can be improved. Additionally, it was carried out a study to test the 
ability of Active Share in predicting future outperformance, aiming to conclude whether 
it must be included in the selection process. 
The internship took place at Millennium bcp Private Banking, Wealth Management 
Unit – Fund Selection Team and it was for six months in full time. The main objective 
of the internship was to support the Team in its daily functions and responsibilities, 
being one more helping to achieve the department’s goals. In the internship it was 
possible to deepen the background in finance, by working with a very skilled Team.  
In the second part of the study, we started by searching factors that according to the 
literature in finance should be taken into account when selecting mutual funds. After 
that, we developed a critical analysis of the current fund selection process of WMU. 
Analyzing it, we could initially propose some improvements that will certainly benefit 
the Team. We firstly suggested the Team should avoid funds with high correlation 
levels with their benchmark indexes as they will probably underperform. According to 
Sortino and Van Der Meer (1991) and Appel (2005), we also suggested they should 
look to sortino ratio and drawdown when assessing mutual funds as both measures give 
a complementary overview of the quality of the portfolio manager/management team. 
Furthermore, we suggest the Team should create a “pool” of funds in order to improve 
their efficiency when selecting a new one in the future.  
After that, we advanced to test whether Active Share matters for fund performance or 
not. We decided to study Active Share mainly because two reasons: Active Share has 
been increasingly approached within the mutual fund industry and the encouragement 
received by WMU. Since the Team does not look to Active Share when selecting 
mutual funds and existing studies find evidence that Active Share is a predictive tool to 
identify the most probable outperformers in the future, we decided to study it deeply. 
Following Petajisto (2013), we firstly distinguished the different types of active 
management. According to both studies, active management can be measured in two 
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different dimensions: Active Share and Tracking Error. Active Share emphasizes stock 
selection while Tracking Error emphasizes exposure to systematic factor risk. It was 
defined five categories of funds, in accordance with the type of active management they 
practice: Stock Pickers, Concentrated, Factor Bets, Moderately Active and Closet 
Indexers funds. We applied the methodology followed by Petajisto (2013), in the time 
period between January 2000 to December 2014, not only to US, but also to Eurozone 
all-equity mutual funds.  
Globally, we found statistically-significant results to say Closet Indexers are not good 
choices for investors who seek outperformer funds. We obtained reliable results to 
prove their consistent underperformance. Furthermore, we also obtained relevant 
evidence for the difference between Stock Pickers and Closet Indexers returns. We 
found that Stock Pickers delivered higher absolute and benchmark-adjusted returns than 
Closet Indexers, in both US and Eurozone samples. Moreover, we found positive 
correlation between Active Share and benchmark-adjusted return within the Eurozone 
and the US as well as positive correlation between Tracking Error and benchmark-
adjusted returns in both regions. 
Therefore, we did not find evidence to directly improve the WMU’s fund selection 
process through the Active Share. We are not able to say that funds with higher Active 
Share are more likely to outperform in the future. On the other hand, we found that 
Closet Indexers funds consistently underperform their benchmark after fees. In this 
sense, we conclude WMU should avoid this kind of funds. 
Although we followed the methodology used by Petajisto (2013), some characteristics 
differentiate both studies. In fact, these different characteristics to some extent limited 
our study. Firstly, our sample is smaller than the one carried out by Petajisto. 
Furthermore, we sorted mutual funds into the five categories on an annual basis while 
Petajisto (2013) did it monthly. Moreover, our samples considered both institutional and 
retail share classes. These two share classes have highly different fees and expenses – 
institutional share classes are theoretically cheaper that the retail ones. Since we only 
considered net returns in our study, this could have biased the results. Lastly, we just 
considered living funds while Petajisto (2013) considered both living and dead funds.  
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Although we did not find relevant evidence, probably the Team should be alert to 
further advances into this matter, since some existing studies find robust evidence to 
prove the predictive power of Active Share.  
For future research, it would be interesting to extend the analysis to a bigger sample as 
well as in a longer time period. Furthermore, it would be also enriching to investigate it 
within other markets such as Emerging Markets, Europe as a whole (not restricting to 
Eurozone), Asian markets and other markets with regulated financial markets.   
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Appendix 1 
(Question 1) Which indicators do you believe to be fundamental when comparing 
funds in the same asset class? 
- “The key question we think is to what extent was the performance of the 
manager in line with the clients’ expectations given the environment we were in.  Do 
they have a documented style bias and was their performance consistent with what one 
might have expected from such a style bias?  An understanding of how the fund is run 
in detail will help to align manager and client expectations. Beyond performance and 
relevant risk metrics the following should be important: stability of Team, incentive 
structures for managers (potential indicator of future stability); managers’ alignment 
with clients (i.e. does their performance drive a large part of their compensation?  Do 
they invest in the fund alongside clients?” – Schroders 
-  “Investment philosophy and style.  If there is an approach described as growth 
or value or top down or bottom-up etc, is this consistently reflected in the process and 
the contribution of returns? As a key indicator for these issues, I would look at 
consistency of a style analysis over a long period of time. For example, does the 
manager reflect their stated philosophy in their portfolio construction and are they 
consistent with it?  I would also look at the attribution of returns to see how this fits in 
with the stated style and process.  I would look at risk adjusted returns over a three and 
five year cycle as a key indicator.  I would also look at the investment management and 
analyst turnover ratio, particularly following periods of poor performance.  This may be 
a good indicator of firms and teams self belief in their stated investment philosophy and 
process after a dip in short term performance.” – Pictet, Equity Portfolio Manager  
-  “A variety of factors are important when assessing a range of comparable equity 
funds, which could be split between a qualitative and quantitative outlook. 
Qualitatively, one could look at the portfolio manager and management team 
(experience/remuneration/assets under management), the manager’s philosophy and the 
investment process.   Quantitatively, the elements involved could include returns (past 
performance drivers/performance in different market conditions), underlying holdings 
(verification of process/trading behaviors/Active Share) and style (structural 
biases/evolution of style exposures). This is not an exhaustive list and before making a 
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fund selection decision, a whole host of indicators and elements should be analyzed 
before making a final investment decision.” – Fidelity, Equity Investment Team 
 
(Question 2) What do you think about the indicator “Active Share” in a process of 
fund selection? Is it relevant? 
-  “We think it is relevant and we quote it frequently.  ‘Traditional’ measures of 
how active a fund is, such as ex ante Tracking Error, can be very volatile and difficult to 
compare given the number of multi-factor models that could be used across the 
industry.  Active Share is simple to calculate, simple to understand and simple to 
compare measure of how different a fund is from its index at any point in time.  It is 
becoming more prevalent in the industry as something that investors are paying 
attention to.” – Schroders 
- “I think it is one indicator that can be useful, particularly if you are comparing 
managers who state that a large proportion of their alpha contribution will come from a 
high conviction, bottom-up approach.  One would have to ensure though, that to make 
the comparison relevant, all the funds were following the same benchmark index.  As 
above I would look at the consistency of Active Share over time and understand why 
there have been (if any) major changes to a mangers Active Share ratio.” – Pictet, 
Equity Portfolio Manager 
-  “Active Share is an important and relevant indicator when selecting from a 
universe of active equity funds, but it is not an element that should be focused on in 
isolation. When using Active Share as a decision metric, one should also take into 
account Tracking Error, concentration of holdings in the portfolio, market 
capitalization, etc., which all contribute to a fuller picture of active management.” – 
Fidelity, Equity Investment Team 
 
(Question 3) Regarding the last question, if yes, is there any kind of relationship 
between “Active Share” and “Tracking Error”? Combining both, do they give any 
insight about future relative performance?  
-  “(…) In the extreme for example, a portfolio could only own one stock (which 
is a non index stock) and have an Active Share of 100%.  But if that stock demonstrated 
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a high degree of correlation to the index over time then Tracking Error could look quite 
low.  All else being equal you would however expect a relationship between the two (I.e 
higher Active Share = higher Tracking Error), but the behavior of the underlying 
holdings in the fund could cause this relationship to break down.(…) A higher Active 
Share and Tracking Error only tells that a fund is different to its benchmark – clearly a 
fund will need to be different in order to outperform, but being different on its own does 
not guarantee outperformance – it could be different and better or different and worse. 
Active risk enables outperformance but certainly does not guarantee it.”- Schroders 
- “I think both measures taken over time and when analyzed for consistency or 
changes in ratios can provide some interesting insights into understanding a 
manager.  However, I do not think they alone can give insights into future relative 
performance." – Pictet, Equity Portfolio Manager 
-  “Yes, there is a relationship between the two. (...) In short, the less active the 
fund, the harder the task of outperforming. (...) Petajisto carried out a 2013 study 
(published in the Financial Analysts Journal), which provided the most comprehensive 
Active Share study ever conducted in relation to the US equity mutual fund market. The 
study found that diversified stock-pickers were the only group to outperform over the 
1990-2009 period, as it appears that high Active Share tends to be put to good use 
through effective stock selection, while good diversification across sectors limits factor 
exposure, ensuring low Tracking Error.” – Fidelity, Equity Investment Team 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Note: Schroders is a British multinational asset management company, founded in 1804 in London. 
Fidelity Worldwide Investment is also an asset management company originally established in 1969 in 
Boston. Pictet is a private bank and also an asset management company founded in Geneva, Switzerland, 
in 1805. The three companies did not provide information regarding the specific name of who answered 
the questions. We could only know that from Fidelity the answers were given by the Equity Investment 
Team while from Pictet were answered by an Equity Portfolio Manager. 
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Appendix 2 
Sample 1 - US Funds represented by Bloomberg tickers 
ABASCI2 LX Equity 
ABCUSEA LX Equity 
ABUEQAU LX Equity 
ABUSMAU LX Equity 
ACMBAVA LX Equity 
AETAMSI LX Equity 
ALLAAXI LX Equity 
ALLBSUE LX Equity 
ANDUSAA AD Equity 
ARUSVIU ID Equity 
ATLAMDI LX Equity 
ATLAMOI LX Equity 
AXARUEA ID Equity 
AXAUSEA ID Equity 
BAC6220 BB Equity 
BALUSAI FP Equity 
BAUSCBU ID Equity 
BAUSSCB ID Equity 
BBHCOSI LX Equity 
BCINUSB SW Equity 
BCPNAUI LX Equity 
BERUSSB LX Equity 
BGINAA2 LX Equity 
BGINAMI ID Equity 
BGNAEA2 LX Equity 
BISEQNA LX Equity 
BLE4727 LX Equity 
BPQFCPC FP Equity 
BSIUSST LX Equity 
CDCOLCI LX Equity 
CDCUSRI LX Equity 
CDCVNUS LX Equity 
CFDWESA LN Equity 
CIUSI1U LX Equity 
CMRPSAA FP Equity 
CNAUIAA ID Equity 
COMWPSC LX Equity 
CONLYRI LX Equity 
CRMGRAA ID Equity 
CRMUSSA ID Equity 
CRSNABI LX Equity 
CSEUSVB LX Equity 
CUNAHAA ID Equity 
DAVDVFA LX Equity 
DBVWDJI LX Equity 
DEUGUWA LX Equity 
DIPVBAA LX Equity 
DLCVLFA ID Equity 
DSMUSLA LX Equity 
DUSI1CU LX Equity 
EDMIAMG LX Equity 
EPCLCEI LX Equity 
ESPAMGR LX Equity 
ESXTUSA AV Equity 
EVMUSMD ID Equity 
FALNAVT LX Equity 
FAMAAGI LX Equity 
FEDUCCU LX Equity 
FEGUCCE LX Equity 
FIFINUS FP Equity 
FIUSMVU ID Equity 
FOREQUC LX Equity 
FORESCC LX Equity 
FRAUSCA LX Equity 
FRUSSCP ID Equity 
FRUUSAI ID Equity 
FUSFAUS LX Equity 
FVSUSEI LX Equity 
GAMAOAU ID Equity 
GSUSEAP LX Equity 
GSUSEUA ID Equity 
GUTZONE SW Equity 
GVFNAES BH Equity 
HENAEA2 LX Equity 
HEPYACC ID Equity 
HERACVA LX Equity 
HERUSGR LX Equity 
HESEGSC LX Equity 
HSMANIX LX Equity 
IAK4151 BB Equity 
INGNAUA LX Equity 
INUSELI LX Equity 
INUSGWI LX Equity 
IOFNAVA LX Equity 
IPMUIBC LX Equity 
IRIUSEI ID Equity 
IUSVAAU LX Equity 
JANACA1 ID Equity 
JANTWA1 ID Equity 
JBSUSAB LX Equity 
JFSRAME HK Equity 
JIUSEQU DC Equity 
JPMNAMA LX Equity 
JUSRCUA LX Equity 
KBC7157 BB Equity 
KBCUSCK BB Equity 
KBDNADU ID Equity 
KBI8985 BB Equity 
KEA2091 BB Equity 
KLPAUSA NO Equity 
LCUFLMA ID Equity 
LGMMEAB LE Equity 
LLBAKNA LE Equity 
LNGPUSI ID Equity 
LNTMVTR AV Equity 
LUEQPRM LX Equity 
LUXUSSP LX Equity 
MCUSELC ID Equity 
MEL500A ID Equity 
MELULAD ID Equity 
MEREQGA LX Equity 
MFSSGA1 LX Equity 
MFSVAB1 LX Equity 
MIGSNOI LX Equity 
MIRUSAA LX Equity 
MLWUSUI ID Equity 
MORAMFA LX Equity 
MORIUSE LX Equity 
MSSUCEA LX Equity 
MTAUSEA LX Equity 
NATHCVI LX Equity 
NAUSFGI FP Equity 
NAUSOPI FP Equity 
NBSCUIA ID Equity 
NBUSU1I ID Equity 
OFIDRUI LX Equity 
OMSUSEI LX Equity 
OPPUSOP LX Equity 
OYUSIU2 LX Equity 
PARUSMC LX Equity 
PBIUSRY ID Equity 
PERUSEI LX Equity 
PIFUEIV ID Equity 
PIHUSEA LX Equity 
PIMSISA ID Equity 
PLNOAIC BB Equity 
PLQUASA LX Equity 
PNBUCUI LX Equity 
POPUSEI LX Equity 
PRIUEQC LX Equity 
PUK3017 LX Equity 
PUTULGA ID Equity 
PWMUSDG GR Equity 
QULUSAB LX Equity 
RBCUSMA LX Equity 
REYNAEQ LX Equity 
RGCUPUD LX Equity 
RUSOEDU LX Equity 
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SAMRGRO LE Equity 
SANNAEA LX Equity 
SARUSAB LX Equity 
SAUSLUI GR Equity 
SBCSMUI LX Equity 
SCENAME LX Equity 
SCSGUSA ID Equity 
SEIUEPN ID Equity 
SESAMFU ID Equity 
SESYSUS LE Equity 
SGGUACB ID Equity 
SGMUCGB ID Equity 
SHBAMSI LX Equity 
SIMUSEA LE Equity 
SIV2686 BB Equity 
SKAENAI LX Equity 
SMVUSIU LX Equity 
SNAETEU ID Equity 
STHUSOA FP Equity 
STKIDXU AV Equity 
STRALFA LX Equity 
STUSMVU ID Equity 
SWESNAB LX Equity 
SWLEQUI LX Equity 
SWMSCUN SW Equity 
TEMAGAI LX Equity 
TEMAMAI LX Equity 
TEMFUAI LX Equity 
TQEUSGC LX Equity 
TRPLGEI LX Equity 
TRPUBCA LX Equity 
TRPULVI LX Equity 
UBAUSRC LX Equity 
UBSKSUB LX Equity 
UBSUSB LX Equity 
UBSUSQB LX Equity 
UBSUSRI LX Equity 
UNINAVI LX Equity 
UNMVUB1 LX Equity 
UOBKSMC ID Equity 
VAMSCCB LX Equity 
VAMSMCB LX Equity 
VAMUMCB LX Equity 
VANGUOD ID Equity 
VANUDVU ID Equity 
VANUISI ID Equity 
VANUSFD ID Equity 
VGTECH1 LX Equity 
VITUSQC LX Equity 
WALPCNA LX Equity 
WBSMIDU LX Equity 
WBUSACA LX Equity 
WELUSCA ID Equity 
WELUSQA ID Equity 
WFUSLCA LX Equity 
WILEQNA LX Equity 
WMPUSEB LX Equity 
XCRUR1C LX Equity 
ZKBUSPN SW Equity 
 
Sample 2 - Eurozone Funds represented by Bloomberg tickers 
ABEURSL SM Equity 
ABFEUR1 FP Equity 
ACMEGAI LX Equity 
AGFACTJ FP Equity 
AGFAEQA LX Equity 
AGFCTEV FP Equity 
AGFEUAC FP Equity 
AGFOPII FP Equity 
ALETHII FP Equity 
ALEXANC FP Equity 
AMPEU50 GR Equity 
AMPPRMU FP Equity 
AMRAEUR FP Equity 
AMSCEUR FP Equity 
ANIEUEI ID Equity 
ARCAFLO FP Equity 
ARGACLF LX Equity 
ARGEURO SM Equity 
ARGFBIB SM Equity 
ASTITBO SM Equity 
AVENEUR FP Equity 
AWFEEAC LX Equity 
AXAEQEC BB Equity 
AXAINEC FP Equity 
AXAREBA ID Equity 
AXARSNE FP Equity 
AXAVEUC FP Equity 
AXFERIA LX Equity 
AXWECEI LX Equity 
AZUCROC FP Equity 
BALEURI FP Equity 
BANEUAC PL Equity 
BANSBSE SM Equity 
BAREVOI LX Equity 
BAZEURO IM Equity 
BBKBEUR SM Equity 
BBKDIVI SM Equity 
BGIEMFA ID Equity 
BKPYMCO SM Equity 
BLAR2IB FP Equity 
BMMACOP FP Equity 
BNPAMEU FP Equity 
BNPEAAC FP Equity 
BPAZETI IM Equity 
BPBAZEU IM Equity 
BPIELCI LX Equity 
BPIEURO PL Equity 
BRNGNC FP Equity 
BROAVEN FP Equity 
BSOEURF FP Equity 
CAAESCA LX Equity 
CAEUOPA LX Equity 
CAGNEER LX Equity 
CAIDXEC LX Equity 
CAJINGI SM Equity 
CAMDVLO FP Equity 
CAMMICO FP Equity 
CAREMCA FP Equity 
CARSTSP FP Equity 
CCXIMMO FP Equity 
CFDAMEU LX Equity 
CFEUROC BB Equity 
CHOLCAP FP Equity 
CIAVEUP FP Equity 
CICEUAC FP Equity 
CICEUOP FP Equity 
CIPREDI FP Equity 
CIPREPE FP Equity 
CIUNIEU FP Equity 
CMTEMKY LX Equity 
COCEPET FP Equity 
CONSUNC FP Equity 
CRMIDCP FP Equity 
CSEQEUF LX Equity 
CSEUROP FP Equity 
DARD80C FP Equity 
DARDIVC FP Equity 
DBVWESI LX Equity 
DEGEMUA BB Equity 
DEXEMUC LX Equity 
DEXLSEZ LX Equity 
DEXQEMU LX Equity 
DORVMEC FP Equity 
DUEUEQI LX Equity 
DWSTEFC LX Equity 
ECACCEC FP Equity 
ECACTRC FP Equity 
ECOSCRC FP Equity 
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EFEULEQ LX Equity 
EISPBEE LX Equity 
ELK3591 LX Equity 
ELNOPEU FP Equity 
EPSQGRO IM Equity 
ESSEUOP FP Equity 
ETOINEU FP Equity 
ETVALUE FP Equity 
EURBVLE LX Equity 
EUREXEE LX Equity 
EURSKGI AV Equity 
EURZQEQ LX Equity 
EUSTAUF GR Equity 
EUSTCK2 FP Equity 
EUVALEU SM Equity 
EXELSIO FP Equity 
EXPEXDU FP Equity 
FCPOPOA FP Equity 
FDIALAZ IM Equity 
FDROPTS FP Equity 
FIDIEBC LX Equity 
FIEUCAP FP Equity 
FIGRAVE FP Equity 
FIMFPME FP Equity 
FIMUNIA FH Equity 
FININTN SM Equity 
FNBEURO SM Equity 
FNDMUSU SM Equity 
FONBEUR SM Equity 
FONCAB5 SM Equity 
FONDEUC LX Equity 
FONDEUD LX Equity 
FONDEUR SM Equity 
FONFIVA SM Equity 
FOREBSA LX Equity 
GAESMAL SM Equity 
GEFEUQC LX Equity 
GESDEAL SM Equity 
GNREQP3 LX Equity 
HAENISO GR Equity 
HENEUDI LX Equity 
HOCHEUR FP Equity 
HRGHEAP FP Equity 
HSBCFEC FP Equity 
HSBEUAC FP Equity 
HSBMIDC FP Equity 
HUMFSER FP Equity 
HYPERIO FP Equity 
IBELBOL SM Equity 
IDEUR50 SM Equity 
INGEMQA LX Equity 
INGEUPC LX Equity 
INT4830 LX Equity 
INVAEUR FP Equity 
ISCERAC FP Equity 
ISIGROC LX Equity 
IXACEVI FP Equity 
JBMEVI1 LX Equity 
JPEDEAA LX Equity 
JPEURAA LX Equity 
KBC6733 BB Equity 
KBCEULK BB Equity 
KBHDVEK BB Equity 
KBI2690 BB Equity 
KBLBDVE LX Equity 
KEE6789 BB Equity 
KIEUEIC BB Equity 
KIFLIDX BB Equity 
LAPLACE GR Equity 
LCELEOP FP Equity 
LFOBDVC FP Equity 
LFPARNC FP Equity 
LFPLEDD FP Equity 
LFRAUDN FP Equity 
LOBETHQ FP Equity 
LUPALMC LX Equity 
LUPSECA LX Equity 
LUXESNI LX Equity 
MACRDRC FP Equity 
MACRODC FP Equity 
MADBOEU SM Equity 
MADUSOL FP Equity 
MAIT100 FP Equity 
MEEFRNE FP Equity 
MEEREVA FP Equity 
MEESAET FP Equity 
MEESVAL FP Equity 
MELLEEA ID Equity 
MEREMAI LX Equity 
MESGPLI FP Equity 
METREUR FP Equity 
METVSRI FP Equity 
MEURMPK FP Equity 
MEZEI1E ID Equity 
MFCSFAC LX Equity 
MILEUEI LX Equity 
MIREEAE LX Equity 
MMAEUAC FP Equity 
MMGIEUA FP Equity 
MONBBMD FP Equity 
MONOFUN NA Equity 
MONQUAD FP Equity 
MOREFAI LX Equity 
MSGLESM SM Equity 
MTEUEAC LX Equity 
MULEURO SW Equity 
NATEUVC FP Equity 
NBGASTA LX Equity 
NII2447 BB Equity 
NSMCRET FP Equity 
OBJACEU FP Equity 
ODDGENC FP Equity 
ODDPIFR FP Equity 
ODEVEPP FP Equity 
OFIEQUI FP Equity 
OFIEURI FP Equity 
OPPES50 GR Equity 
OSI2706 BB Equity 
OSI9180 BB Equity 
OXFXSEL FP Equity 
PFEURID LX Equity 
PIMEURI FP Equity 
PLACPHE LX Equity 
PLEISEL FP Equity 
PLIEUIC BB Equity 
PLUUEUR SM Equity 
POETHIC FP Equity 
PREEURO LE Equity 
PREVBOL SM Equity 
PRIMEURP FP Equity 
PSEUEQ2 LX Equity 
RAYMICC FP Equity 
RBEURST FP Equity 
REN4CAR SM Equity 
RGACTFR FP Equity 
ROTEMEC FP Equity 
RTA4VAL SM Equity 
RUREURV SM Equity 
SAILEEY LX Equity 
SANACCI SM Equity 
SANACEU PL Equity 
SANEURB LX Equity 
SANOEUR LX Equity 
SCHPEIN SM Equity 
SCRNDOC FP Equity 
SEAEAI1 LX Equity 
SGACTES FP Equity 
SGAMEUV FP Equity 
SGEURIE LX Equity 
SGEUZSE LX Equity 
SGINEUR FP Equity 
SGREAEF ID Equity 
SICEURS FP Equity 
SLFEUZM FP Equity 
SOGESCA LX Equity 
SPAFAZI IM Equity 
SSFEEZB LX Equity 
SSGAEAI LX Equity 
SSMEIEC LX Equity 
SSTSEUC FP Equity 
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STHOPME FP Equity 
STRATAC FP Equity 
SURVA21 FP Equity 
SWIEQUA LX Equity 
SYCEURO FP Equity 
SYCLGCP FP Equity 
SYMAZEU IM Equity 
SYNSMAC FP Equity 
SYSEREI FP Equity 
SYSYCTE FP Equity 
TAJFGSE FP Equity 
TEMGROA LX Equity 
TRICOLO FP Equity 
UBSEITL LX Equity 
UIASUUI GR Equity 
ULYSSEC FP Equity 
UNIGEST FP Equity 
UNTRAKT GR Equity 
VALCACE FP Equity 
VANESII ID Equity 
VINCACT FP Equity 
WESCEUR LX Equity 
WWWPERF FP Equity 
XCRER1C LX Equity 
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Appendix 3 
Exhibit 7. Annual distribution of US Mutual Funds across categories 
Category 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 
1 10 11 15 22 24 27 30 28 32 29 32 30 37 38 39 
2 8 7 10 10 9 12 8 12 17 17 18 24 22 22 21 
3 32 38 42 51 61 56 65 71 68 74 82 84 91 97 99 
4 4 6 6 8 11 12 18 16 17 17 16 15 19 20 23 
5 10 10 11 12 9 16 10 12 16 17 17 26 22 25 23 
 
Exhibit 8. Annual distribution of Eurozone Mutual Funds across categories 
Category 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 
1 21 21 24 24 27 32 34 30 35 35 39 37 42 45 45 
2 9 10 12 13 16 16 18 21 23 13 68 25 78 15 14 
3 38 39 49 57 63 71 78 82 91 103 99 151 101 106 164 
4 28 27 33 35 41 49 59 59 65 78 24 20 23 88 32 
5 12 12 14 14 14 16 16 16 17 11 16 27 22 16 15 
 
 
 
 
